Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 73

Issue 1

Article 11

Winter 1-1-2016

In Need of Direction: An Evaluation of the "Direct Effect"
Requirement Under Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
Claire L. Leonard
Washington and Lee University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Claire L. Leonard, In Need of Direction: An Evaluation of the "Direct Effect" Requirement Under
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 73 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 489 (2016).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol73/iss1/11
This Student Notes Colloquium is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review
at Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

In Need of Direction: An Evaluation of
the “Direct Effect” Requirement Under
the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act†
Claire L. Leonard ∗
Table of Contents
I. Introduction .....................................................................490
II. History of U.S. Antitrust Law’s Extraterritorial
Reach ..............................................................................493
A. The Sherman Act’s Extraterritorial Reach
Before 1982 ................................................................494
B. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1982 .................................................................496
1. Statutory Language .............................................496
2. Congressional Purpose ........................................497
C. Early Interpretations of the FTAIA ..........................498
III. Diverging Tests for Direct Effect .....................................502
A. Immediate Consequence Test....................................503
B. Reasonably Proximate Causal Nexus Test ...............507
1. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit ..................................................................507
† This Note received the 2015 Roy L. Steinheimer Award for outstanding
student Note.
∗ J.D. Candidate, Washington and Lee University School of Law, May
2016. I would like to thank the members of the editorial board, especially Krista
Consiglio and Meg Sawyer, for their countless rounds of insightful feedback on
this Note. I extend my gratitude to Professor Eggert for his valuable
contributions and guidance throughout the drafting process. I thank my family
for their tireless support, not only during the writing process, but also in all of
my endeavors. Lastly, I dedicate this Note to my Godfather, John Hanks, for
sharing with me his passion for the law and encouraging me to pursue a legal
career.

489

490

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489 (2016)
2. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit ..................................................................509
3. Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission ...............................................511

IV. Evaluation of the Direct Effect Tests ..............................512
A. Immediate Consequence Test....................................512
1. Definition of Direct ..............................................512
2. Use of Direct in Other Statutes ...........................513
3. The FTAIA’s Legislative History and
Existing Common Law Standards.......................515
B. Reasonably Proximate Causal Nexus Test ...............520
1. Definition of Direct ..............................................521
2. Plain Language ....................................................522
3. Consistent with the Purposes of the FTAIA .......523
4. Weaknesses of the Reasonably Proximate
Causal Nexus Test ...............................................526
V. Policy Considerations ......................................................527
VI. Conclusion ........................................................................531
I. Introduction
Courts have long struggled with the question of when
American antitrust laws apply to foreign anticompetitive
conduct. 1 The precise extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws
remains uncertain as the global economy becomes increasingly
interdependent and international trade barriers evaporate. 2
Courts face the daunting task of balancing two competing
interests: (1) encouraging vigorous antitrust enforcement against
1. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 353–58 (1909)
(considering the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act for the first
time since the statute’s enactment).
2. See Robert D. Sowell, New Decisions Highlight Old Misgivings: A
Reassessment of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act Following
Minn-Chem, 66 FLA. L. REV. 511, 511 (2014) (evaluating the extraterritorial
reach of U.S. antitrust law); see also Diane P. Wood, Foreword to MARK R.
JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER, at xi, xi (2d ed. 2001) (“The
volume of international transactions has exploded: old political barriers to trade
and commerce have fallen; and the world of cyberspace is quickly erasing what
is left of national boundaries for economic purposes.”).
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anticompetitive conduct that harms American commerce and
(2) accommodating the antitrust regimes of foreign nations. 3
The Sherman Act 4 makes illegal every contract, combination,
or conspiracy in restraint of interstate or foreign commerce. 5
Congress enacted the statute in 1890 to “secure equality of
opportunity to protect the public against evils commonly incident
to destruction of competition through monopolies and
combinations in restraint of trade.” 6 Soon thereafter, the question
arose as to whether and to what extent the Sherman Act applied
extraterritorially. 7 At first, the U.S. Supreme Court strictly
limited the Sherman Act’s application to when conduct occurred
overseas. 8 Some years later, Judge Learned Hand took a different
approach, declaring that the Sherman Act applies to foreign
conduct that has an “effect” on U.S. commerce. 9 Subsequent
judicial applications of Judge Hand’s “effects test” produced
varied expressions of the standard and created confusion among
courts and the antitrust community. 10
In 1982, Congress enacted the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act 11 (FTAIA) with the intention of clarifying the
3. See Makan Delrahim, Drawing the Boundaries of the Sherman Act:
Recent Developments in the Application of the Antitrust Laws to Foreign
Conduct, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SERV. AM. L. 415, 430–31 (2005) (summarizing the
problems associated with balancing interests when evaluating the
extraterritorial reach of the antitrust laws).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
5. Id.
6. Charles A. Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters, 260 U.S. 501, 512
(1923).
7. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 359 (1909)
(analyzing the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial reach for the first time).
8. See id. at 355–56 (refusing to apply U.S. antitrust laws to conduct
occurring in Panama and Costa Rica).
9. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443–44 (2d
Cir. 1945) (articulating a two-part “effects test” in which American antitrust
laws may reach foreign conduct that intended to affect and actually effected
domestic commerce).
10. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2 (1982) (noting that “courts differ[ed] in
their expression[s] of the proper test”); Max Huffman, A Retrospective on
Twenty-Five Years of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 44 HOUS. L.
REV. 285, 310–13 (2007) (discussing the confusion resulting from different
phrasings of the effects test).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012).
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international reach of U.S. antitrust laws. 12 The FTAIA provides
that foreign conduct is outside of the scope of the Sherman Act
unless it “has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect” on domestic or import commerce and “such effect gives rise
to a claim under the [Sherman Act].” 13 Since the FTAIA’s
passage, courts and practitioners alike have struggled to
determine the meaning of the word “direct.” 14 In a globalized
economy, the precise meaning of direct becomes even more
elusive—and even more significant—in the face of complex
corporate structures and elaborate supply chains that span
numerous countries. 15
A split amongst the U.S. Courts of Appeals has emerged
regarding the proper test for determining whether foreign
conduct has a sufficiently direct effect on U.S. commerce to
trigger application of the Sherman Act. 16 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit says an effect is direct if it follows
as an “immediate consequence” of the anticompetitive conduct. 17
Meanwhile, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second and
Seventh Circuits have endorsed a different standard in which
directness requires a “reasonably proximate causal nexus”
between conduct and effect. 18 The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to
weigh in.
12. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2 (seeking to clarify the Sherman Act’s
reach with respect to international transactions).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (emphasis added).
14. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS
225 (2007), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/chapter
2.pdf (“The complex wording of [the FTAIA], however, has also resulted in
ambiguities. The territorial scope of the Sherman Act and who may bring a
claim under it thus remains unclear.”).
15. See Delrahim, supra note 3, at 415 (discussing the need for antitrust
laws to respond to the “increasing interdependency of the global economy”); see
also Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 74 (1992) (“The growing significance of international
trade and investment has increasingly led the United States and other nations
to devote regulatory attention to conduct occurring abroad.”).
16. See infra Part III (discussing the diverging tests for direct effect).
17. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir.
2004) (articulating the immediate consequence test).
18. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 398 (2d
Cir. 2014) (adopting the reasonably proximate causal nexus test); Minn-Chem,
Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (same).
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This Note considers whether the proper test for a direct effect
under the FTAIA is (1) if the effect follows as an immediate
consequence of the anticompetitive conduct, as the Ninth Circuit
has held, or (2) if there is a reasonably proximate causal nexus
between the conduct and the effect, as the Second and Seventh
Circuits have held. Ultimately, this Note recommends that courts
adopt the reasonably proximate causal nexus test because (1) it is
an appropriate construction of the statutory language given the
FTAIA’s purpose and history and (2) it provides the flexibility
necessary to address anticompetitive conduct in the context of a
complex global economy. Part II first describes the development
of extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law. It then
summarizes
the
FTAIA’s
enactment
and
significant
interpretations. Part III presents the diverging interpretations of
what constitutes a direct effect under the FTAIA. Part IV
evaluates the merits of each test and argues that the reasonably
proximate causal nexus test is the superior standard. Finally,
Part V urges courts to consider important policy concerns when
interpreting the FTAIA.
II. History of U.S. Antitrust Law’s Extraterritorial Reach
Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares that “[e]very contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations” is illegal. 19
Enacted in 1890, the Sherman Act avows to “preserve[] free and
unfettered competition” 20 and to “protect United States
consumers from the consequences of anticompetitive conduct.” 21
A textual analysis of Section 1 reveals that Congress
intended the Sherman Act to extend to at least some foreign
commerce. 22 Commerce “with” foreign nations refers to “business
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
20. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
21. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d at 693 (Aldisert, J., dissenting); see also
Joseph P. Bauer, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Do We Really
Want to Return to American Banana?, 65 ME. L. REV. 3, 5 (2012) (describing the
purposes of the Sherman Act as “enhancement of consumer welfare, the
promotion of competition, and compensation of the victims of antitrust
violations”).
22. See 1B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
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transactions between some portion of the United States and a
foreign country, going in either direction.” 23 This is made clear
when juxtaposed with Congress’s use of “among” to refer to
interstate commerce. 24 Congress certainly intended the Sherman
Act to apply to commerce between individual states, but it did not
intend for it to apply to commerce between two foreign nations. 25
Thus, the Sherman Act may reach foreign commerce. The
question remains, however, exactly when such foreign activity
comes within the Sherman Act’s scope.
A. The Sherman Act’s Extraterritorial Reach Before 1982
The Supreme Court first addressed the Sherman Act’s
extraterritorial reach in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co. 26 In American Banana, an Alabama corporation alleged that
a New Jersey corporation engaged in anticompetitive activity in
Panama and Costa Rica. 27 The Court concluded the Sherman Act
did not extend to conduct occurring abroad. 28 Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes recognized the importance of respecting a
sovereign nation’s authority over acts occurring within its own
jurisdiction. 29 The Court articulated the “territoriality test,”
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 272a, at 274–75
(3d ed. 2006) (summarizing the Sherman Act’s applicability to foreign conduct).
23. Id. ¶ 272a, at 275.
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (prohibiting anticompetitive activity “among the
several States” (emphasis added)); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note
22, ¶ 272i, at 286 (noting the absence of “express authority to regulate
commerce ‘among’ foreign nations”).
25. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, ¶ 272i, at 286 (“[T]he
language would not obviously reach commerce from, say, Ecuador to Germany,
for that would ordinarily be considered commerce ‘among’ foreign nations or
‘purely foreign’ commerce.”).
26. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
27. See id. at 354 (summarizing the plaintiff’s allegations).
28. See id. at 355 (explaining that “the acts causing the damage were
done . . . outside the jurisdiction of the United States,” and finding it “entirely
plain that what defendant did in Panama or Costa Rica is not within the scope
of the [Sherman Act]”).
29. See id. at 356 (indicating that such overreaching “not only would be
unjust, but would be an interference with the authority of another sovereign,
contrary to the comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly might
resent” (citation omitted)).
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noting “the general and almost universal rule . . . that the
character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined
wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.” 30
Courts have since abandoned American Banana’s
territoriality standard and replaced it with the “effects test.” 31 In
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 32 Judge
Learned Hand construed the Sherman Act to mean a “state may
impose liabilities . . . for conduct outside its borders that has
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends.” 33
He further concluded that American antitrust laws extend to
foreign acts that are intended to affect U.S. commerce and
actually have such an effect. 34 Alcoa dictated that “the situs of
the effects as opposed to the conduct” determined whether U.S.
antitrust laws applied. 35 Thus, anticompetitive activity that
“restrain[s] the domestic or foreign commerce of the United
States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because
part of the conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries.” 36
Following Alcoa, it became “abundantly plain that some
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act [was] proper.” 37

30. Id.
31. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp.
1161, 1181 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (“American Banana has never been explicitly
overruled. However, its authority has been so eroded by subsequent case law as
to have been effectively limited to its specific factual pattern.”); Dominicus
Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (stating that “history has proven American Banana to be not a seminal
decision but an aberration”); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, ¶ 272c, at
278 (“Since at least 1945, the American Banana test has been rejected.”).
32. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The Second Circuit sat as a court of last
resort because the Supreme Court lacked a quorum. Id. at 421. Thus, the Alcoa
decision carries the precedential weight of a Supreme Court opinion.
33. Id. at 443 (citations omitted).
34. See id. at 443–44 (articulating the appropriate standard for assessing
whether U.S. antitrust law covers foreign conduct); see also H.R. REP. NO.
97-686, at 5 (1982) (summarizing the Alcoa test); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 22, ¶ 272d, at 179–80 (explaining the Alcoa decision).
35. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 5 (1982) (citation omitted).
36. Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 705
(1962) (rejecting the American Banana test when conduct “had an impact within
the United States and upon its foreign trade”).
37. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161,
1185 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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The effects test, however, led to confusion among courts
regarding the nature and extent of effects required. 38
B. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982
1. Statutory Language
In 1982, Congress enacted the FTAIA to clarify the
extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law. 39 The statute provides
that the Sherman Act
shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other
than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations
unless—
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect—
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce
with foreign nations, or on import trade or import
commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign
nations, of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in
the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the [Sherman Act]. 40

This effectively means the antitrust laws do not apply to
most foreign anticompetitive conduct. 41 The FTAIA initially
38. Compare Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 383 F.
Supp. 586, 587 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (looking to whether the conduct “directly affect[s]
the flow of foreign commerce into or out of this country”), with United States v.
R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 822 (N.D. Cal. 1957) (requiring a “direct and
substantial restraint” (emphasis added)), and United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 82
F. Supp. 753, 891 (D.N.J. 1949) (asserting that foreign conduct “must have had
a direct and substantial effect” (emphasis added)), with Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v.
Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 883 (5th Cir. 1982) (requiring conduct to “directly or
substantially affect” U.S. commerce in order to come “within the scope of the
Sherman Act” (emphasis added)), and Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W.
Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“[I]t is probably not
necessary for the effect on foreign commerce to be both substantial and direct as
long as it is not [d]e minimis.”).
39. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2 (indicating the statute’s purpose).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012).
41. See F. Hoffman–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 158
(2004) (discussing the FTAIA’s text); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 22,
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excludes all export and other commercial activities occurring
abroad from the Sherman Act’s scope. 42 It then provides an
exception bringing “such conduct back within the Sherman Act’s
reach provided that the conduct both (1) sufficiently affects
American commerce . . . and (2) has an effect of a kind that
antitrust law considers harmful.” 43 The FTAIA does not apply to
import trade and import commerce because that activity is
already subject to the Sherman Act. 44
2. Congressional Purpose
Congress enacted the FTAIA in 1982 with two primary
purposes: (1) to clarify the scope of the Sherman Act’s jurisdiction
with respect to foreign transactions and (2) to boost American
exports. 45 Various courts had reached different conclusions
regarding the precise nature and extent of the effect required
under Alcoa. 46 Congress intended the FTAIA’s objective “direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” test to “serve as a simple
and straightforward clarification of existing American law and
the Department of Justice enforcement standards.” 47 Thus, the
Act was supposed to provide “a clear benchmark” for

¶ 272i, at 288 (same).
42. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 162 (interpreting the FTAIA’s technical
language).
43. Id.
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (covering conduct with foreign nations “other than
import trade or import commerce”); H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 9 (“[I]t is important
that there be no misunderstanding that import restraints, which can be
damaging to American consumers, remain covered by the [Sherman Act].”
(quoting Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 99 (1981) (statement of James R.
Atwood, Partner, Covington & Burling))); id. at 10 (clarifying that “import
transactions are not” covered by the FTAIA amendment).
45. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2 (clarifying the Sherman Act “to make
explicit [its] application only to conduct having a ‘direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect’ on domestic commerce or domestic exports” and
seeking “to promote American exports”).
46. See id. at 5 (discussing inconsistencies in courts’ application of the
Alcoa test).
47. Id. at 2.
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businesspeople, the legal community, and America’s trading
partners. 48
The FTAIA is primarily concerned with American consumers
and exporters. 49 The Act provides that the antitrust laws do not
apply to wholly foreign transactions or export trade unless the
requisite effect is felt within the United States. 50 Accordingly, the
Sherman Act does not reach conduct that causes purely foreign
injury. 51 In enacting the FTAIA, Congress aimed to “release
domestic (and foreign) anticompetitive conduct from Sherman Act
constraints when that conduct causes foreign harm.” 52 This
limitation reflects Congress’s fear that expansive extraterritorial
reach of the U.S. antitrust laws would expose American courts to
litigation “at the behest of foreign interests in cases having only
minimal consequences for American economic interests.” 53
C. Early Interpretations of the FTAIA
The FTAIA initially garnered little attention after its
passage in 1982. 54 About a decade later, courts began wrestling
48. Id. at 2–3.
49. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, ¶ 272i, at 287 (“[T]he concern
of the antitrust laws is protection of American consumers and American
exporters, not foreign consumers or producers.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 97-686,
at 2 (hoping the FTAIA would “encourage the business community to engage in
efficiency producing joint conduct in the export of American goods and
services”); 127 CONG. REC. H779 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1981) (statement of Rep.
Peter W. Rodino) (noting that the bill aims to allow “American firms greater
freedom when dealing internationally while reinforcing the fundamental
commitment of the United States to a Competitive domestic marketplace”).
50. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 10 (establishing that “wholly foreign
transactions . . . are covered by the amendment” if they satisfy the effect
requirement).
51. See F. Hoffman–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 161
(2004) (“The FTAIA seeks to make clear to American exporters (and to firms
doing business abroad) that the Sherman Act does not prevent them from
entering into business arrangements (say, joint-selling arrangements), however
anticompetitive, as long as those arrangements adversely affect only foreign
markets.”).
52. Id. at 166.
53. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, ¶ 272i, at 287.
54. See, e.g., United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 678 (9th
Cir. 2004) (“Federal courts did not shower the FTAIA with attention for the first
decade after its enactment.”); Delrahim, supra note 3, at 419 (“For several years,
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with the statute and interpreting its technical, inelegant
language. 55 In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 56 the
Supreme Court resolved any lingering tension between American
Banana and Alcoa, declaring: “[I]t is well established by now that
the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to
produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the
United States.” 57
Courts have interpreted the antitrust laws, including the
FTAIA, with an eye towards the principle of comity. 58 As a
general interpretive rule, ambiguous statutes are normally
construed “to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign
authority of other nations.” 59 Courts must assume Congress
judiciously considered other nations’ sovereign interests when
drafting legislation. 60 Because the underlying purpose of the
antitrust laws is to protect American consumers and American
commerce, “U.S. law should not supplant the policy choices that
other countries have made” when the injury is felt outside of the
United States. 61 The Supreme Court has warned of the “serious
courts seemed to avoid the FTAIA, and it attracted little attention well into the
1990s.”).
55. See, e.g., LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d at 698 (noting “the case
reporters have steadily filled with decisions interpreting this previously obscure
statute”); Empagran, 542 U.S. at 162 (characterizing the FTAIA’s language as
“technical”); United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.
1997) (“The FTAIA is inelegantly phrased . . . .”).
56. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
57. Id. at 796 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 582 n.6 (1986)).
58. See Delrahim, supra note 3, at 421 (emphasizing that courts should
construe “U.S. antitrust laws, like other U.S. laws,” to avoid undue interference
with the legitimate interests of foreign sovereigns); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(1) (AM. LAW
INST. 1987) (“[A] state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect
to a person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise
of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.”).
59. F. Hoffman–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004)
(citations omitted).
60. See id. (discussing the assumption that legislators account for other
sovereigns’ legitimate interests).
61. Delrahim, supra note 3, at 421 (explaining the importance of comity
when enforcing U.S. antitrust laws); see also Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434
U.S. 308, 314 (1978) (“Congress’ foremost concern in passing the antitrust laws
was the protection of Americans.”).
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risk of interference with a foreign nation’s ability to
independently regulate its own commercial affairs.” 62
Application of U.S. antitrust laws to foreign conduct, however,
may still accord with the principle of comity as long as it
“reflect[s] a legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury
that foreign anticompetitive conduct has caused.” 63
While the FTAIA aimed to clarify the extraterritorial reach
of U.S. antitrust law, the amendment actually left many
questions unanswered. 64 One interpretative issue is whether the
FTAIA’s restrictions on the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial scope
are jurisdictional or substantive in nature. 65 A substantive
statutory provision defines the elements essential for a
meritorious claim, whereas subject matter jurisdiction relates to
The
a
court’s
power
to
hear
a
case. 66
substantive-versus-jurisdictional distinction matters because it
affects, for example, how courts handle disputed facts and
dictates when a party may raise a claim. 67
Initially, courts treated the FTAIA’s limitations as
jurisdictional constraints rather than substantive elements of a
62. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 (1986) (“American antitrust laws do not
regulate the competitive conditions of other nations’ economies.”).
63. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165 (citations omitted).
64. See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 10, at 285 (“Far from bringing clarity to
the law of extraterritorial antitrust enforcement, the FTAIA has introduced
confusion into a regime that, before its enactment, was a modestly successful
common-law scheme.”).
65. Compare United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942,
952 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (deeming the FTAIA’s limitations to be
jurisdictional), overruled by Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th
Cir. 2012) (en banc), with Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp.,
654 F.3d 462, 469 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that “the FTAIA imposes a substantive
merits limitation rather than a jurisdictional bar”).
66. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austrl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 254 (2010)
(explaining the difference between subject-matter jurisdiction and merits
questions in the context of extraterritorial securities law); Animal Science, 654
F.3d at 467 (discussing substantive and jurisdictional limitations with respect to
the FTAIA).
67. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 852–53 (7th Cir.
2012) (en banc) (explaining the importance of the distinction). For example, the
distinction controls whether a party uses a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, per Rule 12(b)(1). Id.
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claim. 68 This changed after Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 69 an
employment discrimination case in which the Supreme Court
announced a bright-line test to determine when statutory
requirements are jurisdictional:
If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on
a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and
litigants will not be left to wrestle with the issue. But when
Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as
jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as
nonjurisdictional in character. 70

Since Arbaugh, the federal courts of appeal have determined that
the FTAIA’s requirements go to the merits of a Sherman Act
claim rather than to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 71
Another major issue is whether the FTAIA codified existing
common law standards—as applied in Alcoa and its progeny—or
introduced a new dimension to antitrust law. 72 This critical
68. See, e.g., United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 952 (characterizing FTAIA
inquiries as jurisdictional because the “FTAIA limits the power of the United
States courts (and private plaintiffs) from nosing about where they do not
belong”); Filetech S.A. v. Fr. Telecom S.A., 157 F.3d 922, 931 (2d Cir. 1998)
(describing the FTAIA’s limitations as jurisdictional). But see Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act . . . has nothing to do with the
jurisdiction of the courts. It is a question of substantive law turning on whether,
in enacting the Sherman Act, Congress asserted regulatory power over the
challenged conduct.”). Although the Hartford Fire majority “had no need to
engage the dissenters on the ‘element’ versus ‘jurisdiction’ point,” Justice
Scalia’s dissent still sheds light on the issue. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at
956 (Wood, J., dissenting).
69. 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
70. Id. at 515–16 (analyzing whether a statutory limitation in Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 affects subject matter jurisdiction or constitutes a
“substantive element of the claim on the merits”).
71. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 405 (2d
Cir. 2014) (“[T]he requirements of the FTAIA are substantive and
nonjurisdictional in nature.”); Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 852 (adopting rule “that
the FTAIA spells out an element of the claim”); Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China
Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 469 (3d Cir. 2011) (overruling earlier precedent
construing “the FTAIA as imposing a jurisdictional limitation on the application
of the Sherman Act”).
72. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 678 (9th Cir.
2004) (noting that “many courts have debated whether the FTAIA established a
new jurisdictional standard or merely codified the standard applied in Alcoa and
its progeny”).
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question ultimately informs the meaning of direct and thus the
proper test for determining the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial
reach. 73 If the FTAIA merely codified existing law, then precedent
must guide any judicial interpretation of the word direct. 74 If the
FTAIA articulated a new dimension of antitrust law, however,
then courts interpret the meaning of direct from scratch because
the pre-FTAIA common law does not guide their analysis. 75
In Hartford Fire, the Supreme Court raised this question—
without answering it—in the context of an alleged conspiracy
among London reinsurance companies to manipulate the primary
insurance market in the United States. 76 The Court noted that it
is “unclear . . . whether the [FTAIA’s] ‘direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect’ standard amends existing law or
merely codifies it. We need not address [this] question[] here.” 77
The issue of whether Congress intended to substantively change
the preexisting common law standards remains open to debate. 78
III. Diverging Tests for Direct Effect
Following the FTAIA’s enactment, the legal community
struggled to define the word direct. 79 The Ninth Circuit was the
first “to face the dragon in his teeth and stop tap dancing around

73. See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text (explaining significance of
codification debate).
74. See LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d at 691 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (“I
am guided by contemporary definitions of the term as well as relevant
precedent, including that which preexisted by the FTAIA.”).
75. Cf. id. at 679–80 (majority opinion) (interpreting the FTAIA anew
without relying on existing common law standards).
76. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 770–78 (1993)
(summarizing the case).
77. Id. at 796 n.23 (citation omitted).
78. See Delrahim, supra note 3, at 418 (“The common law standard for the
reach of the Sherman Act to foreign conduct may or may not have changed with
the enactment of the FTAIA . . . .”).
79. See Huffman, supra note 10, at 315 (“‘[D]irect, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable’ is not self-defining and has created interpretive
difficulties.”); Sowell, supra note 2, at 514 (“[T]he FTAIA has merely added to
the mounting confusion surrounding the application of American antitrust laws
to foreign conduct.”).
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the meaning of the word ‘direct.’” 80 Since then, two other circuits
have tackled the issue and reached a different conclusion. 81
A. Immediate Consequence Test
The Ninth Circuit articulated the immediate consequence
test in United States v. LSL Biotechnologies. 82 In LSL
Biotechnologies, the government brought an antitrust action
challenging
a
noncompete
agreement
between
LSL
Biotechnologies (an American corporation) and Hazera (an Israeli
corporation). 83 These companies sought to develop a
genetically-altered tomato seed that would produce ripe tomatoes
with enough shelf life to travel from the growing locations to the
various markets without spoiling. 84 The agreement allocated to
each party exclusive territories to sell long shelf-life seeds, and
LSL Biotechnologies received North America in the deal. 85 The
government challenged the agreement as a “naked restraint of
trade” because it “unreasonably reduc[ed] competition to develop
better seeds for fresh-market, long shelf-life tomatoes for sale in
the United States.” 86
A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s dismissal of the government’s complaint because the
noncompete agreement did not have a direct effect on U.S.
commerce, as required by the FTAIA. 87 The Ninth Circuit
announced that a direct effect “follows as an immediate
consequence” of the conduct at issue. 88 The effect cannot depend
80. United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 684 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Aldisert, J., dissenting).
81. See infra Parts III.B.1–2 (presenting an alternative test adopted by the
Second and Seventh Circuits).
82. 379 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2004).
83. Id. at 674.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 674–75.
86. Id. at 675.
87. See id. (“[T]he United States has not presented us with sufficient
evidence to conclude that the district court clearly erred in ruling on the existing
pleadings that Hazera’s exclusion does not yet have a direct effect on domestic
commerce.”).
88. Id. at 680 (citing Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618
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on uncertain and intervening events. 89 In reaching this
conclusion, the majority cited a dictionary published
contemporaneously with the FTAIA’s enactment, which defined
direct as “proceeding from one point to another in time or space
without deviation or interruption.” 90
The Ninth Circuit majority also relied on the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the term direct in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA). 91 The FSIA states, in relevant part, that
sovereign immunity of foreign nations does not extend to conduct
“outside the territory of the United States . . . that . . . causes a
direct effect in the United States.” 92 In Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc., 93 the Supreme Court interpreted this provision
and determined that an effect is direct under the FSIA if it is an
immediate consequence of the conduct. 94 Weltover denied that the
FSIA section at issue “contains any unexpressed requirement of
‘substantiality’ or ‘foreseeability’” qualifying the requisite direct
effect. 95
In interpreting the FTAIA’s legislative history, the LSL
Biotechnologies court rejected the contention that “the FTAIA
merely codified the existing common law regarding when the
Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct.” 96 The court refused to
apply Alcoa’s effects test anymore. 97 It believed Alcoa only
required “some substantial effect in the United States.” 98 Thus,
(1992)).
89. See id. at 681 (“An effect cannot be ‘direct’ where it depends on such
uncertain intervening developments.”).
90. Id. at 680 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
640 (1981)).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2012).
92. Id. § 1605(a)(2) (emphasis added).
93. 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
94. See id. at 618 (defining “direct effect” under the FSIA).
95. Id. The Court’s statement is relevant because the FTAIA, unlike the
FSIA, does contain express requirements of foreseeability and substantiality.
See infra notes 125–130 and accompanying text (differentiating between the
FSIA and FTAIA).
96. United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir.
2004).
97. See id. (concluding that the FTAIA’s promulgation precludes any
reliance on Alcoa).
98. Id. at 679 (quoting Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764,
796 (1993)).
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the court viewed the directness requirement as a new ingredient
the FTAIA added to existing extraterritorial standards. 99 So it
interpreted the word direct anew—that is, not considering prior
antitrust common law interpretations—and formulated the
immediate consequence test. 100
Judge Aldisert, a seasoned antitrust jurist, criticized the
majority’s interpretation of direct in his dissenting opinion. 101 He
asserted that the FTAIA’s use of the word direct is “merely a
codification of antitrust law in place prior to the enactment of the
FTAIA.” 102 He further contended the direct effects requirement
has been an integral part of antitrust law before and after the
FTAIA’s passage in 1982. 103 To support this proposition, Judge
Aldisert pointed to historical case law (dating back to 1898), the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations of the United States
(1965), the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Antitrust Guide for
International Operations (1977), and the American Bar
Association (ABA) Section of Antitrust Law’s Report Concerning
Legislative Proposals to Promote Export Trading (1981). 104
Next, Judge Aldisert rejected the majority’s characterization
of the Alcoa decision. 105 In Alcoa, Judge Learned Hand stated
that “the ingot fabricated by ‘Alcoa,’ necessarily had a direct effect
upon the ingot market.” 106 Thus, the LSL Biotechnologies
majority’s contention that Alcoa did not contemplate a directness
99. See id. (contending that Congress would not have said “direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” if it meant to require only “some
substantial effect”); id. at 680 n.6 (stating that the FTAIA, not the common law,
provides the source of the directness requirement).
100. See id. at 680 (interpreting direct and failing to consult common law
extraterritoriality standards to inform the analysis).
101. See id. at 692 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s
interpretation of direct).
102. Id. at 683.
103. See id. at 685–87 (asserting that the “direct effects” test has long been
“part and parcel of antitrust law”).
104. See id. at 685–91 (detailing the history of extraterritorial antitrust law
from 1898 through the FTAIA’s passage in 1982). See also infra Part IV.A.3 for
an in-depth discussion of pre-FTAIA extraterritorial standards.
105. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 687 (9th Cir.
2004) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s analysis of Alcoa).
106. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945)
(emphasis added).
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requirement actually “runs counter to the explicit teachings of
Alcoa.” 107
Judge Aldisert also criticized the majority’s reliance on one
particular definition of the word direct. 108 Courts assume that
Congress intends words to carry “their ordinary, contemporary,
common meaning.” 109 The definition used by the majority—
“proceeding from one point to another in time or space without
deviation or interruption” 110—is but one of seven main meanings
in the same dictionary, many of which are ordinary and
common. 111 Thus, it is arbitrary to select one definition and
“declare it the ‘plain meaning’ in the abstract.” 112 Rather,
deducing the meaning of direct requires consideration of the
various contemporaneous definitions as informed by the statute’s
history and context. 113
Alternatively, Judge Aldisert proposed a definition
synonymous with proximate cause in light of the history of
extraterritoriality and the overall purpose of antitrust law. 114
While Judge Aldisert could not convince the other Ninth Circuit
panelists of this position, his definition gained traction eight
years later when the issue came before the Seventh Circuit. 115
107. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d at 687. Judge Aldisert noted that both
Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, leading commentators on this issue,
echoed his view of Alcoa: “As Judge Hand made clear in his Alcoa opinion, the
Sherman Act would govern the world unless significant/direct/intended effects
were required, for American commerce is affected in some degree by every force
affecting the world’s markets in which we buy or sell.” Id. (quoting 4 PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 272, at 363 (2d ed. 2000)).
108. See id. at 692 (critiquing the majority’s interpretation).
109. Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. LP, 507 U.S. 380, 388
(1993) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
110. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 640 (1981).
111. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 692 (9th Cir.
2004) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (discussing other definitions).
112. Id.
113. See id. (requiring consideration of the FTAIA’s context and history in
defining direct).
114. See id. at 692–94 (arguing that the most appropriate definition is
“characterized by or giving evidence of a close especially logical, causal, or
consequential relationship” (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 640 (1981)).
115. See infra Part III.B.1 (describing the Seventh Circuit’s adoption of the
reasonably proximate causal nexus standard).
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B. Reasonably Proximate Causal Nexus Test
The Seventh and Second Circuits have endorsed a competing
approach, under which an effect is direct—for FTAIA purposes—
when there is a reasonably proximate causal nexus between the
conduct and effect. 116 The Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have also endorsed
this test. 117
1. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
In Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 118 American purchasers
of potash 119 accused foreign potash producers of participating in
an international cartel that “restrained global output of potash in
order to inflate prices.” 120 The plaintiffs alleged that defendants
conspired to fix prices in various foreign countries and used those
inflated prices as benchmarks for sales in the United States. 121
The Seventh Circuit considered whether the defendants’ allegedly
anticompetitive conduct had the requisite direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce. 122
The Seventh Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s
denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss. 123 In doing so, the court
interpreted the FTAIA’s domestic-injury exception and
116. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 398 (2d
Cir. 2014) (articulating the reasonably proximate causal nexus test);
Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 856–57 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(same).
117. See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as
Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 13–14, Motorola Mobility LLC v.
AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-8003) [hereinafter
DOJ & FTC Motorola Brief] (arguing in favor of the proximate cause standard).
118. 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
119. Potash is “a naturally occurring mineral used in agricultural fertilizers
and other products.” Id. at 848.
120. Id. at 849.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 859 (analyzing whether the defendants’ conduct satisfied the
FTAIA’s requirements).
123. See id. (“It is no stretch to say that the foreign supply restrictions, and
the concomitant price increases forced upon the Chinese purchasers, were a
direct—that is, proximate—cause of the subsequent price increases in the
United States.”).
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determined that directness is synonymous with proximate
cause. 124 Judge Wood, writing for the majority, reasoned that the
nexus test is more consistent with the statutory language than
the immediate consequence test. 125 The court criticized the Ninth
Circuit for using the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FSIA
to interpret the FTAIA. 126 The two statutes have distinct textual
differences: the FSIA requires only a “direct” effect, while the
FTAIA requires a “direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable” effect. 127 Furthermore, the Supreme Court in
Weltover announced that the FSIA does not contain an
unexpressed requirement of foreseeability or substantiality. 128
The FTAIA, on the other hand, explicitly includes the words
“substantial” and “foreseeable.” 129 Thus, Congress signaled that
the words direct, substantial, and foreseeable are to be
interpreted as an integrated phrase. 130 The Seventh Circuit
explained that adding the concept of immediacy or certainty on
top of the “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable”
requirements “results in a stricter test than the complete text of
the statute can bear.” 131
The reasonably proximate causal nexus test properly
excludes “foreign activities that are too remote from the ultimate
effects on U.S. domestic or import commerce.” 132 Judge Wood
noted that this approach addresses the classic concern about
124. See id. at 856–57 (considering “what it takes to show ‘direct’ effects”
and announcing that “the term ‘direct’ means only ‘a reasonably proximate
causal nexus’”).
125. See id. (“We are persuaded that the [reasonably proximate causal
nexus] approach is more consistent with the language of the statute.”).
126. See id. (“In our view, the Ninth Circuit jumped too quickly to the
assumption that the FSIA and the FTAIA use the word ‘direct’ in the same
way.”).
127. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012) (FSIA), with 15 U.S.C. § 6a
(2012) (FTAIA).
128. See Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc. 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992)
(analyzing the use of direct in the FSIA).
129. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 845 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir. 2012)
(en banc) (explaining that there is no need to read “substantial” and
“foreseeable” into the statute).
130. See id. (reading direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable as an
integrated phrase).
131. Id.
132. Id.
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remoteness—that courts “should not impute to Congress an
intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct which
has no consequences within the United States.” 133 Just as tort
law cuts off recovery for injuries too remote from the cause of an
injury, the FTAIA excludes from the Sherman Act’s scope foreign
activities “too remote from the ultimate effects on U.S. domestic
or import commerce.” 134
2. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
The Second Circuit also adopted the reasonably proximate
causal nexus test in Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Industry
Co. 135 The plaintiff in Lotes was a Taiwanese corporation that
designs and manufactures universal serial bus (USB) connectors
that are incorporated into electronics manufactured abroad and
later sold in the United States. 136 By endorsing the reasonably
proximate causal nexus approach, the court widened the split as
to what constitutes a direct effect under the FTAIA. 137 Judge
Katzmann, writing for the majority, criticized the Ninth Circuit’s
reliance on a single definition of direct in the dictionary, 138 when
“the same dictionary also defines ‘direct’ as ‘characterized by or
giving evidence of a close especially logical, causal, or
consequential relationship.’” 139 Given the various alternative
definitions offered in that particular dictionary, relying solely on
the first definition listed was arbitrary and insufficient. 140
133. Id. (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443
(2d Cir. 1945)).
134. Id.
135. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 398 (2d
Cir. 2014) (requiring “a reasonably proximate causal nexus between the conduct
and the effect” to satisfy the FTAIA’s directness component).
136. Id. at 399–400.
137. Compare Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir.
2012) (en banc) (adopting the reasonably proximate causal nexus test), with
United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004)
(adopting the immediate consequence test).
138. See Lotes, 753 F.3d at 410 (discussing the definition cited in LSL
Biotechnologies).
139. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 640
(1981)).
140. See id. (“[T]he relative order of the common dictionary definitions of a
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The Second Circuit also found the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on
the interpretation of a “nearly identical term” in the FSIA to be
inappropriate. 141 Judge Katzmann reiterated the Supreme
Court’s warning that courts “must be careful not to apply rules
applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful
and critical examination.” 142 The FSIA differs from the FTAIA in
critical respects and therefore cannot be relied upon in
interpreting the ambiguous language of the FTAIA. 143
The Second Circuit determined that LSL Biotechnologies’
interpretation of the word direct violates the “‘cardinal principle
of statutory construction’ that statutes must be construed, if
reasonably possible, so that ‘no clause, sentence, or word shall be
superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” 144 If direct is read to mean
immediate, the separate “reasonably foreseeable” requirement
“would be rob[bed] . . . of any meaningful function, since we are
hard pressed to imagine any domestic effect that would be both
‘immediate’ and ‘substantial’ but not ‘reasonably foreseeable.’” 145
While the court ultimately decided the case based on the
FTAIA’s second prong, 146 the Second Circuit nonetheless
announced its adoption of the reasonably proximate causal nexus
test to satisfy the FTAIA’s directness requirement. 147
single term does little to clarify that term’s meaning with a particular context.
When a word has multiple definitions, usage determines its meaning.” (quoting
Chi. Truck Drivers v. Leaseway Transp. Corp., 76 F.3d 824, 828 n.4 (7th Cir.
1996))).
141. See id. (noting that “[m]ost words have different shades of meaning and
consequently may be variously construed, not only when they occur in different
statutes, but when used more than once in the same statute or even the same
section” (quoting Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007))).
142. Id. (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009)).
143. See id. at 410–11 (analyzing the differences between the FSIA and
FTAIA). See also infra Part IV.A.2 for further discussion about using the FSIA
to interpret the FTAIA.
144. Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 411 (2d Cir.
2014) (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)).
145. Id.
146. See 15 U.S.C. § 6(a)(2) (2012) (requiring the effect “give rise to” an
antitrust cause of action).
147. See Lotes, 753 F.3d at 398 (determining that the direct requirement is
satisfied “even if the effect does not follow as an immediate consequence of the
defendant’s conduct, so long as there is a reasonably proximate causal nexus
between the conduct and the effect”).
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3. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—the governmental
entities charged with enforcing the federal antitrust laws—
endorse the reasonably proximate causal nexus test. 148 The DOJ,
in its LSL Biotechnologies brief, urged that the most pertinent
definition of direct for FTAIA purposes is “characterized by or
giving evidence of a close especially logical, causal, or
consequential relationship.” 149 The DOJ highlighted that courts
also utilize the concepts of directness and proximate causation
when confronting antitrust standing inquiries in private
plaintiffs’ suits. 150 When determining which injuries the antitrust
laws may properly redress, courts look at the directness of the
injury sustained to determine whether it is too remote from the
antitrust violation to warrant relief. 151 In the standing context,
courts equate remoteness and directness with the concept of
proximate cause. 152 The DOJ and FTC maintain that courts
should similarly employ proximate causation to the FTAIA
directness inquiry. 153
The DOJ and FTC assert that “[p]roximate causation is a
‘flexible concept that generally refers to the basic requirement
that . . . there must be some direct relation between the injury
asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.’” 154 This standard
filters out “causal connections ‘so attenuated that the
148. See DOJ & FTC Motorola Brief, supra note 117, at 1, 13–14 (arguing in
favor of the proximate cause standard); Delrahim, supra note 3, at 430 (“[T]he
correct interpretation of ‘direct’ in the FTAIA is a reasonably proximate causal
nexus.”). Makan Delrahim is the former Deputy Assistant Attorney General of
the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division. Id. at 415.
149. Brief for Appellant United States of America at 36, United States v.
LSL Biotechnologies, Inc., 379 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-16472)
[hereinafter DOJ LSL Biotechnologies Brief].
150. Id.
151. See id. at 36–37 (citing Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465,
477 n.12 (1982)) (describing antitrust standing inquiries).
152. See id. at 37 (citing Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477
nn.12–13 (1982)) (analogizing proximate cause to remoteness and directness).
153. See DOJ & FTC Motorola Brief, supra note 117, at 14 (comparing the
FTAIA directness issue to the remoteness issue in antitrust standing analyses).
154. Id. at 13 (quoting Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1719
(2014)).
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consequence is more aptly described as mere fortuity.’” 155 The
DOJ and FTC maintain that proximate causation is the
appropriate test for determining when the Sherman Act may
reach foreign anticompetitive conduct. 156
IV. Evaluation of the Direct Effect Tests
A. Immediate Consequence Test
As articulated by the Seventh Circuit, Second Circuit, and
Judge Aldisert in his LSL Biotechnologies dissent, the immediate
consequence test has three significant flaws: (1) it is based on an
improper definition of direct; (2) it inappropriately relies on the
FSIA to interpret the FTAIA; and (3) it misinterprets the
FTAIA’s legislative history and the preexisting common law
standard. 157
1. Definition of Direct
When interpreting ambiguous statutory language, courts
assume that Congress intends words to carry “their ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning.” 158 In analyzing the word direct
as employed by the FTAIA, the Ninth Circuit in LSL
Biotechnologies selected one definition, without explanation, and
treated it as the plain meaning. 159 The definition employed by the
majority—“proceeding from one point to another in time or
space without deviation or interruption”—is only one of many
ordinary and common meanings of the term direct. 160 The same
155. Id. at 14 (quoting Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1719
(2014)).
156. Id. at 13–14; see also Delrahim, supra note 3, at 430 (“In the Division’s
view, the correct interpretation of ‘direct’ in the FTAIA is a reasonably
proximate causal nexus.”).
157. See infra Parts IV.A.1–3 (evaluating the immediate consequence test).
158. Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380,
388 (1993) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
159. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 679–80 (9th
Cir. 2004) (looking to a contemporaneous definition in considering “what
Congress meant by ‘direct’”).
160. See id. (discussing other definitions).
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dictionary also contains six additional main meanings of direct,
which are similarly contemporaneous with the FTAIA. 161 Usage
of a word in context should determine its meaning when it has
multiple alternative definitions. 162 The majority failed to
adequately articulate why its particular definition is appropriate
in light of the FTAIA’s context and history. 163
Because a definition centered on geography and time forms
the basis of the immediate consequence test, the standard too
narrowly focuses on the spatial and temporal separation between
the conduct and effect. 164 This fails to adequately consider the
complex nature of the global economy and that “anticompetitive
injuries can be transmitted through multi-layered supply
chains.” 165 A lapse of time between when the anticompetitive
conduct occurred and when the effect is felt does not necessarily
mitigate the harm. Perpetrators could easily design schemes to
avoid antitrust injury by ensuring that the conduct and harmful
effect do not occur sequentially. 166
2. Use of Direct in Other Statutes
Another rule of statutory construction cautions courts not to
“apply rules applicable under one statute to a different statute
161. Id. (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 640
(1981)).
162. See Chi. Truck Drivers v. Leaseway Transp. Corp., 76 F.3d 824, 828 n.4
(7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he relative order of the common dictionary definitions of a
single term does little to clarify that term’s meaning within a particular context.
When a word has multiple definitions, usage determines its meaning.”).
163. See LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d at 680 (dedicating only one
paragraph to considering dictionary definitions); see also id. at 692 (Aldisert, J.,
dissenting) (“It would be arbitrary simply to pick one definition and declare it
the ‘plain meaning’ in the abstract. Determining the meaning of ‘direct’ requires
the consideration of definitions as informed by the FTAIA’s context and
history.”).
164. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 412 (2d
Cir. 2014) (critiquing the immediate consequence test).
165. Id.
166. See id. at 413 (“Indeed, given the important role that American firms
and consumers play in the global economy, we expect that some perpetrators
will design foreign anticompetitive schemes for the very purpose of causing
harmful downstream effects in the United States.”).
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without careful and critical examination.” 167 Words frequently
“have different shades of meaning, and consequently may be
variously construed . . . when they occur in different statutes.” 168
The Ninth Circuit in LSL Biotechnologies presented a very
cursory analysis of the FSIA’s use of the term direct and failed to
explain the justification for relying on the FSIA in interpreting
the FTAIA. 169 Without careful and critical examination, the
FSIA’s use of direct provides an insufficient basis for interpreting
the FTAIA in the same way. 170
The two statutes differ in critical respects. 171 The FSIA’s
overarching purpose is to grant foreign nations sovereign
immunity 172 and to serve as “the sole basis for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state in” American courts. 173 The
FTAIA, on the other hand, is a substantive antitrust statute that
clarifies “the Sherman Act’s scope as applied to foreign
commerce.” 174
Furthermore, the statutes have significant textual
differences. 175 The FSIA does not extend sovereign immunity to
167. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009) (quoting Fed.
Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393 (2008)).
168. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007) (quoting Atl.
Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)).
169. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir.
2004) (interpreting the meaning of direct in just two paragraphs).
170. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir. 2012)
(en banc) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit jumped too quickly to the assumption that the
FSIA and the FTAIA use the word ‘direct’ in the same way.”).
171. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 410–11 (2d
Cir. 2014) (comparing the FSIA and the FTAIA).
172. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012) (establishing that “a foreign state shall be
immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the
States except as provided” by certain statutory exceptions).
173. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443
(1989) (emphasis added).
174. F. Hoffman–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004)
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2–3 (1982)). At the time the Ninth Circuit
decided LSL Biotechnologies, the courts still considered the FTAIA a
jurisdictional rather than substantive statute. See, e.g., LSL Biotechnologies,
379 F.3d at 679 (“Our precedent supports the conclusion that the FTAIA
provides the guiding standard for jurisdiction over foreign restraints of trade.”).
However, courts now treat the FTAIA as delineating a substantive element of
an antitrust claim. Supra notes 65–71 and accompanying text.
175. See infra notes 176–180 and accompanying text (analyzing the textual
differences between the FSIA and the FTAIA).
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extraterritorial conduct that has a “direct effect” in the United
States. 176 The FTAIA, by contrast, contains the more extensive
phrase “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect.” 177
The Supreme Court in Weltover explicitly stated that the FSIA
lacks “any unexpressed requirement of ‘substantiality’ or
‘foreseeability.’” 178 This means that a direct effect provides the
baseline of the FSIA’s extraterritorial jurisdiction. 179 The FTAIA,
however, requires more—it demands an effect that is not only
direct, but also substantial and reasonably foreseeable. 180
In creating the immediate consequence test, the Ninth
Circuit erroneously relied on the FSIA to interpret the FTAIA
without careful and critical consideration of the important
differences between the two statutes. 181
3. The FTAIA’s Legislative History and Existing Common Law
Standards
The Ninth Circuit in LSL Biotechnologies misinterpreted the
pre-FTAIA legal landscape when it determined that the FTAIA
added an additional requirement to the existing common law
standard for extraterritoriality. 182 The majority believed that,
“[un]like the FTAIA, the Alcoa test d[id] not require the effect to
be ‘direct’” and only mandated “‘some substantial effect in the
176. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (declining to extend sovereign immunity to
“an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States”). In other words, the FSIA provides jurisdiction over
a foreign state for certain foreign conduct that has a “direct effect on the United
States.” Id.
177. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2012).
178. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992).
179. See id. at 617–18 (rejecting the contention that under the FSIA “an
effect is not ‘direct’ unless it is both ‘substantial’ and ‘foreseeable’”).
180. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 692 n.5 (9th
Cir. 2004) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (comparing the sine qua non of the FSIA and
FTAIA provisions at issue).
181. See supra notes 167–180 and accompanying text (contending that the
FSIA should not serve as the basis for interpreting the word direct in the
FTAIA).
182. See LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d at 679 (rejecting the contention that
“the FTAIA merely codified the existing common law regarding when the
Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct”).

516

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489 (2016)

United States.’” 183 However, Alcoa did in fact contemplate a
directness requirement. 184 In analyzing the effect of Alcoa’s
anticompetitive behavior in manufacturing aluminum ingot,
Judge Hand discussed how “the ingot fabricated by ‘Alcoa,’
necessarily had a direct effect upon the ingot market.” 185 The
Alcoa decision emphasized the need for “significant and direct
effects” on U.S. commerce. 186 The LSL Biotechnologies majority
erred in concluding the FTAIA added a brand new component
previously unknown to traditional extraterritorial antitrust
law. 187
The more appropriate reading is that Congress intended to
codify, rather than add a new dimension to, the existing common
law effects test. 188 “Directness” was integral to extraterritorial
antitrust law when Congress enacted the FTAIA. 189 All of the
requirements in the FTAIA—directness, substantiality, and
foreseeability—were present in the earlier case law. 190 The
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, in effect at the time of the FTAIA’s promulgation in 1982,
183. Id. (quoting Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796
(1993)); see also id. (“[A]pplying the Alcoa test would render meaningless the
word ‘direct’ in the FTAIA.”).
184. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, ¶ 272i, at 292–93 (“As Judge
Hand made clear in his Alcoa opinion, the Sherman Act would govern the world
unless significant/direct/intended effects were required, for American commerce
is affected in some degree by every force affecting the world’s markets in which
we buy and sell.”).
185. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir.
1945).
186. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, ¶ 272i, at 292–93.
187. See infra notes 188–216 and accompanying text (arguing that the
FTAIA codified existing law).
188. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 685–91 (9th
Cir. 2004) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (tracing the history of the effects test and
highlighting Congress’s codification of this existing standard); see also AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, ¶ 272i, at 292 (suggesting that codification of prior
law is the better reading of the FTAIA).
189. See infra notes 190–198 and accompanying text (detailing prevalence of
a directness requirement).
190. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287,
1297 (3d Cir. 1979) (considering the “[e]xistence of intent to harm or affect
American commerce and its foreseeability”); United States v. R.P. Oldham Co.,
152 F. Supp. 818, 822 (N.D. Cal. 1957) (requiring a “direct and substantial
restraint”); United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 891 (D.N.J. 1949)
(asserting that foreign conduct “must have had a direct and substantial effect”).
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included directness, substantiality, and foreseeability as
prerequisites to extraterritorial application of domestic law. 191
After Alcoa and its subsequent judicial interpretations, the
DOJ announced its view on the application of antitrust laws to
foreign conduct in its Antitrust Guide to International
Operations, released in 1977. 192 Congress summarized the DOJ’s
stance in the FTAIA’s House Report:
United States antitrust laws should be applicable to an
international transaction “when there is a substantial and
foreseeable effect on the United States commerce,” and that it
would be a miscarriage of Congressional intent to apply the
Sherman Act to “foreign activities which have no direct or
intended effect on United States consumers or export
opportunities . . . .” 193

Thus, in 1977—five years prior to the FTAIA’s enactment—the
DOJ understood that extraterritorial application of the antitrust
laws required foreign transactions to have a substantial,
foreseeable, and direct effect on the United States. 194
In October 1981, the ABA Section of Antitrust Law
submitted a report to Congress regarding the proposed legislation
on extraterritorial antitrust law. 195 The report examined existing
case law applying the effects test articulated in Alcoa. 196 Even
191. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (providing that a state’s laws may reach
“conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory
if . . . the effect within the territory is substantial” and “it occurs as a direct and
foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory” (emphasis added)).
192. See ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST GUIDE TO INT’L
OPERATIONS 6–7 (1977) [hereinafter DOJ ANTITRUST GUIDE] (remarking that
“[t]he application of U.S. antitrust law to overseas activities raises some difficult
questions”).
193. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 5 (1982) (emphasis added) (citing DOJ
ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 192, at 6–7).
194. See DOJ ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 192, at 9 (presenting DOJ’s
interpretation of the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial scope).
195. See Am. Bar Ass’n, Section of Antitrust Law, Report to Accompany
Resolutions Concerning Legislative Proposals to Promote Export Trading 10
(1981) [hereinafter ABA Antitrust Section Report] (commenting on legislative
proposals affecting extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law), reprinted in The
Commission on the International Application of the U.S. Antitrust Laws Act:
Hearing on S. 432 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 216–51
(1981).
196. See id. at 10–21 (analyzing cases using Alcoa’s effects test).
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though the various formulations of the test were not linguistically
identical to the standard propounded by the DOJ in its
guidelines, “in substance, the tests were, for the most part,
applied quite similarly.” 197 The ABA report determined that,
despite the variations in wording, “there [was], with rare
exception, no significant inconsistency between judicial
precedents and the Justice Department’s view of the effects
test.” 198
While the FTAIA’s legislative history does not explicitly
answer whether or not the FTAIA codified the common law
extraterritorial standards, it still remains informative on the
question. 199 The House Report indicated that the FTAIA was to
“serve as a simple and straightforward clarification of existing
American law and the Department of Justice enforcement
standards.” 200 In the wake of Alcoa, “courts ha[d] arrived at
different formulations of the nature and quantum of ‘effects’
needed” to permit application of the Sherman Act to foreign
conduct. 201 The Report discussed the existing case law and
whether the differing articulations of the effects test led to
197. Id. at 10.
198. Id.
199. See Delrahim, supra note 3, at 418 (commenting that the common law
standard “may or may not have changed with the enactment of the FTAIA in
1982; the legislative history does not answer this question”); see also Ryan A.
Haas, Act Locally, Apply Globally: Protecting Consumers from International
Cartels by Applying Domestic Antitrust Law Globally, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV.
99, 106 (2003) (describing how the FTAIA’s legislative history is open to various
interpretations).
200. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2 (1982).
201. Id. at 5 (citing cases applying the effects test in the wake of Alcoa).
Compare, e.g., Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 383 F. Supp.
586, 587 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (looking to whether the conduct “directly affect[s] the
flow of foreign commerce into or out of this country”), with United States v. R.P.
Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 822 (N.D. Cal. 1957) (necessitating a “direct and
substantial restraint” (emphasis added)), and United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 82
F. Supp. 753, 891 (D.N.J. 1949) (asserting that foreign conduct “must have had
a direct and substantial effect” (emphasis added)), with Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v.
Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 883 (5th Cir. 1982) (requiring conduct to “directly or
substantially affect[]” U.S. commerce in order to come “within the scope of the
Sherman Act” (emphasis added)), and Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W.
Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“[I]t is probably not
necessary for the effect on foreign commerce to be both substantial and direct as
long as it is not [d]e minimis.”).
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consistent or divergent results. 202 It did not decide the question,
however. 203
Regardless of whether or not the various judicial
formulations produced inconsistent outcomes, the bill sought to
prescribe a “single, clear standard” that would “provide
assurances against private plaintiff’s [sic] successfully proposing
different standards than those employed by the Department of
Justice.” 204 This would “allow consistent precedent to develop by
providing more definite touchstones to guide the parties and the
courts.” 205
Well-established principles of statutory construction counsel
against reading the FTAIA as substantively changing the
preexisting extraterritoriality standards. 206 Courts must read
“statutes which invade the common law . . . with a presumption
favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles,
except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.” 207
Similarly, when a statute amends a preexisting statute, courts
likewise “do not presume that the revision worked a change in
the underlying substantive law unless an intent to make such a
change is clear.” 208
The FTAIA does not show a clear intention to abandon the
longstanding common law because the Supreme Court announced
that the FTAIA is “unclear” as to whether it amends existing
202. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 5–6 (summarizing the viewpoint that
there is “no significant inconsistency between judicial precedents and the
Justice Department’s view of the effects test” (quoting ABA Antitrust Section
Report, supra note 195, at 10)), with id. at 6 (“Judicial decisions are rife with
inconsistencies regarding the types of effects on the domestic economy that must
be demonstrated in order to establish U.S. antitrust jurisdiction over an
international transaction.” (quoting Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act,
Hearings on H.R. 2326 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 108 (1981) (statement of
Martin F. Connor, Business Roundtable))).
203. See id. at 6 (“The Committee need not choose between these competing
views to conclude that legislative clarification is appropriate.”).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See infra notes 207–210 and accompanying text (discussing a new
statute’s effect on existing law).
207. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (quoting Isbrandtsen
Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)).
208. Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 209 (1993).
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law. 209 The legislative history, moreover, does not clearly express
an intention to make significant changes to prior interpretations
of the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial reach. 210 Congress intended
the FTAIA to be a “clarification of existing American law.” 211
Because the statute does not explicitly indicate a contrary
intention, the FTAIA should not be read as altering the settled
extraterritorial standards that predated its enactment. 212
The promulgation of the “direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable” standard in the FTAIA likely codified the direct
effects requirement set forth in the teachings of Alcoa and its
progeny, the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, and the
DOJ’s Antitrust Guide to International Operations. 213 Even if it
did not codify, Congress certainly did not intend the FTAIA to
erase decades of common law. 214 The LSL Biotechnologies court
erred in interpreting the word from scratch. 215 Relevant
precedent, including that which preexisted the FTAIA, should
have informed the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the term direct
when it formulated the immediate consequence test. 216
B. Reasonably Proximate Causal Nexus Test
The reasonably proximate causal nexus test is the more
appropriate standard because it (1) employs a fitting definition of

209. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797 n.23 (1993)
(declaring it “unclear . . . whether the [FTAIA’s] ‘direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect’ standard amends existing law or merely codifies
it”). The Supreme Court declined to decide the issue, however. See id. (“We need
not address th[is] question[] here.”).
210. See Delrahim, supra note 3, at 418 (commenting that the common law
standard “may or may not have changed with the enactment of the FTAIA in
1982; the legislative history does not answer this question”).
211. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2 (2012) (emphasis added).
212. Supra notes 206–210 and accompanying text.
213. Supra notes 182–205 and accompanying text.
214. Supra notes 206–212 and accompanying text.
215. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 691 (9th Cir.
2004) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s decision to interpret the
word direct anew).
216. Supra notes 182–212 and accompanying text.
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the word direct; (2) corresponds with the statute’s plain language;
and (3) comports with the purposes of the FTAIA. 217
1. Definition of Direct
Given that the FTAIA codified existing common law
extraterritoriality standards, 218 relevant precedent predating the
Act informs any interpretation of the word direct. 219 There are
numerous contemporaneous definitions of direct that are both
ordinary and common. 220 One such definition is “characterized by
or giving evidence of a close especially logical, causal, or
consequential relationship.” 221 Because statutory interpretation
is a “holistic endeavor,” the inquiry does not end at finding an
ordinary meaning. 222 In accordance with the fundamental
principle of statutory construction, the “meaning of a word cannot
be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in
which it is used.” 223 Here, the FTAIA’s context and history must
inform any construction of the meaning of direct. 224 The most
pertinent definition of direct is one that focuses on logical
217. See infra Parts IV.B.1–4 (evaluating the reasonably causal nexus test).
218. See supra Part IV.A.3 (arguing that the FTAIA codified prior common
law).
219. See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (“[S]tatutes which
invade the common law . . . are to be read with a presumption favoring the
retention of long-established and familiar principles . . . .” (quoting Isbrandtsen
Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952))); Keene Corp. v. United States, 508
U.S. 200, 209 (1993) (noting that when interpreting a statute amending a
preexisting statute, courts “do not presume that the revision worked a change in
the underlying substantive law unless an intent to make such a change is
clearly expressed”).
220. See e.g., 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 702 (2d ed. 1989) (defining
direct as, inter alia, “[s]traight; undeviating in course; not circuitous or crooked”
and “[p]roceeding from antecedent to consequent, from cause to effect, etc.;
uninterrupted, immediate”).
221. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 640 (1981).
222. See U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S.
439, 455 (1993) (contending that statutory construction “must account for a
statute’s full text, language as well as punctuation, structure, and subject
matter”).
223. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993).
224. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 692 (9th Cir.
2004) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (“Determining the meaning of ‘direct’ requires the
consideration of definitions as informed by the FTAIA’s context and history.”).
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causation—rather than temporal or spatial relationships—
because it comports with the FTAIA’s plain language and serves
the statute’s fundamental goals. 225
2. Plain Language
The structure of Section 6a(1) supports the position that
courts should interpret the term direct as a causation concept. 226
The interpretative maxim noscitur a sociis, that “a word is known
by the company it keeps,” informs the analysis. 227 This doctrine is
applied “where a word is capable of many meanings in order to
avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of
Congress.” 228 Thus, direct, as used in the FTAIA, cannot be
interpreted in isolation—instead, “direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable” should be read as an integrated
phrase. 229
Defining direct as a term of causation—meaning not too
remote—makes sense when the word is read in conjunction with
the substantiality and foreseeability requirements. 230 If direct
means not too remote, then the three requirements of
Section 6a(1) are: (1) the effect is not too remote from American
commerce (direct); (2) the effect makes a meaningful impact on
such commerce (substantial); and (3) “the effect bears a
reasonable relationship to the actor’s expectations and was not
merely serendipitous” (reasonably foreseeable). 231
225. See infra Parts IV.B.2–3 (arguing for defining direct in terms of
proximate causation).
226. See infra notes 227–237 and accompanying text (analyzing the
provision’s plain language).
227. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995) (explaining
the noscitur a sociis doctrine).
228. Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961).
229. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir. 2012)
(en banc) (suggesting that Congress, in putting the words direct, substantial,
and foreseeable together, signaled that the words “had to be interpreted as part
of an integrated phrase”).
230. See infra notes 231–237 and accompanying text (explaining why
remoteness is the better interpretation).
231. See Delrahim, supra note 3, at 430 (arguing that the most natural
reading of direct is as a term of causation).
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On the other hand, if direct means certainty (as required in
the immediate consequence test), 232 then the reasonably
foreseeable requirement is robbed of its meaning. 233 Reasonably
foreseeable covers a “broad range of possibilities, from effects that
are very likely to effects that are not particularly likely but still
plainly possible.” 234 If an effect must be reasonably certain (or at
least not uncertain), then the effect cannot simultaneously be
somewhat likely or merely possible. 235 Therefore, defining direct
to mean reasonably certain “drastically shrinks the scope of
‘reasonably foreseeable’ to the point of rendering that term
largely meaningless, a result that Congress cannot be presumed
to have intended.” 236 This reading of the FTAIA would violate the
“cardinal principle of statutory construction” that statutes must
be construed so that “no clause, sentence, or word should be
superfluous, void, or insignificant.” 237
3. Consistent with the Purposes of the FTAIA
Statutory construction is a “holistic endeavor” 238 and courts
must consider a statute’s underlying purpose and policy when
interpreting a given provision. 239 The reasonably proximate
232. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 681 (9th Cir.
2004) (incorporating notion of certainty into the immediate consequence test
because “[a]n effect cannot be ‘direct’ where it depends on . . . uncertain
intervening developments”).
233. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 411 (2d
Cir. 2014) (“Reading ‘direct’ as ‘immediate’ would rob the separate ‘reasonabl[e]
foreseeab[ility]’ requirement of any meaningful function . . . .”); Delrahim, supra
note 3, at 430 (asserting that the concept of “immediate consequence” is not
reconcilable with the FTAIA’s “reasonably foreseeable” requirement).
234. Delrahim, supra note 3, at 430 n.78.
235. See id. (contending that reasonably foreseeable encompasses the
concepts of “somewhat likely” and “merely possible”).
236. Id.
237. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v.
Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
238. United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484
U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
239. See U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S.
439, 455 (1993) (“Over and over we have stressed that ‘[i]n expounding a
statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence,
but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.’”
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causal nexus test is more consistent with the FTAIA’s language
because it aptly addresses antitrust law’s classic concern about
remote injuries. 240 In Alcoa, Judge Learned Hand stressed that
courts “should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all
whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences
within the United States.” 241 The word direct in the FTAIA serves
to “exclude[] from the Sherman Act foreign activities that are too
remote from the ultimate effects on U.S. domestic or import
commerce.” 242 Similarly, proximate cause, as used in tort law,
“cuts off recovery for those whose injuries are too remote from the
causal event.” 243 Interpreting direct to mean proximate cause
enables the FTAIA to properly exclude remote injuries. 244
Proximate causation, while not easily defined, is essentially a
flexible concept that, at minimum, requires “some direct relation
between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” 245
Any given injury has “countless causes, and not all should give
rise to legal liability.” 246 Because liability cannot attach to “every
conceivable harm that can be traced” to the allegedly wrongful
(quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdoré, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1850))).
240. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir. 2012)
(en banc) (articulating that the DOJ’s proximate cause standard is superior to
the immediate consequences test because it better address remoteness).
241. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.
1945).
242. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 857.
243. Id.; see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2645 (2011)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (stating that proximate cause “excludes from the
scope of liability injuries that are too remote, purely contingent, or indirect”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp.,
503 U.S. 258, 268–274 (1992))).
244. See supra notes 239–243 and accompanying text (explaining why
proximate cause properly deals with remote activities that the FTAIA seeks to
exclude from the Sherman Act’s scope).
245. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2014) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. (“The idea of proximate
cause . . . defies easy summary.”); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1390 (2014) (characterizing the
“proximate-cause inquiry” as “not easy to define”).
246. See CSX Transp., 131 S. Ct. at 2637 (“In a philosophical sense, the
consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of an event go back
to the dawn of human events, and beyond.” (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984))); Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at
1719 (“Every event has many causes . . . and only some of them are proximate,
as the law uses that term.”).
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act, proximate cause demands a “causal connection between the
wrong and the injury.” 247 Deeming one event to be the proximate
cause of another “means that it was not just any cause, but one
with a sufficient connection to the result.” 248 A proximate-cause
requirement serves to preclude liability for causal connections so
tenuous that the outcome is better characterized as “mere
fortuity.” 249
Courts have significant experience with the proximate-cause
inquiry, and it is a familiar concept in the antitrust world. 250 At
the time of the FTAIA’s enactment, private plaintiffs’ antitrust
standing treated the concepts of directness and proximate cause
as comparable. 251 Using proximate cause principles, courts today
continue to evaluate antitrust standing by considering the
“directness or indirectness of the asserted injury.” 252
The reasonably proximate causal nexus test “incorporates all
of this useful judicial experience.” 253 The doctrine also provides
the legal vocabulary for “excluding conduct deemed too remote
from its injurious effect.” 254 Interpreting direct to mean
proximate cause further serves the overall purpose of U.S.
antitrust law—to protect American consumers from the harmful
consequences of anticompetitive conduct. 255 By requiring a causal
247. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 533 n.26 (1983).
248. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1719 (emphasis added).
249. Id. (citation omitted).
250. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 412 (2d
Cir. 2014) (“[C]ourts have long applied notions of proximate causation, using the
language of ‘directness,’ in determining what types of injuries the antitrust laws
may properly redress.”).
251. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476 nn.12–13 (1982)
(discussing historical antitrust standing inquiries that equated remoteness with
directness and characterizing the terms as analogous to the concept of
proximate cause).
252. See Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 540 (analyzing antitrust
standing by evaluating the directness of the injury); Blue Shield, 457 U.S. at
476–77 & n.13 (using a proximate-cause analysis to determine when “a
particular injury is too remote” to warrant antitrust standing).
253. Lotes, 753 F.3d at 398.
254. Id. at 412.
255. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 693 (9th Cir.
2004) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (describing the Sherman Act’s “fundamental
purpose” as “protect[ing] United States consumers from the consequences of
anticompetitive conduct”); see also United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S.
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connection between any alleged foreign wrongdoing and the
injurious effect, the FTAIA excludes conduct with only remote
injuries and thereby allows the Sherman Act to focus on conduct
that sufficiently harms U.S. commerce. 256
4. Weaknesses of the Reasonably Proximate Causal Nexus Test
While the reasonably proximate causal nexus test is superior
to the immediate consequence test, it is not without flaws. 257
Because the test is less stringent than the immediate
consequence standard, it is vulnerable to exceedingly liberal
interpretations, which “risks unreasonable interference with the
sovereignty of foreign countries.” 258 The proximate cause doctrine
is “notoriously slippery” and nebulous. 259
The proximate causal nexus test also requires a
fact-intensive analysis to determine whether the conduct and
domestic effect are sufficiently direct. 260 It will depend on factors
such as “the structure of the market and the nature of the
commercial relationships at each link in the causal chain.” 261 The
reasonably proximate causal nexus test could lead to uncertainty
596, 610 (1972)
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the
Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the
preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as
the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal
freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no
matter how small, is the freedom to compete—to assert with vigor,
imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it
can muster.
256. See supra notes 238–255 and accompanying text (detailing how a
proximate cause standard helps the FTAIA serve its intended purposes).
257. See infra notes 258–262 and accompanying text (describing the
weaknesses of the test).
258. Recent Case, Antitrust—Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act—
Second Circuit Adopts Minn-Chem Test for Domestic Effects—Lotes Co. v. Hon
Hai Precision Industry Co., 753 F.3d 395 (2d Cir. 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 759,
759 (2014).
259. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 412 (2d
Cir. 2014) (discussing proximate causation).
260. See Recent Case, supra note 258, at 763–64 (critiquing the reasonably
proximate causal nexus test).
261. Lotes, 753 F.3d at 413.
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because any analysis will be case-specific and therefore more
difficult for companies to gauge their exposure to antitrust
liabilities. 262
V. Policy Considerations
Courts need to adopt an interpretation of the term direct that
both reflects a loyal construction of the FTAIA and also addresses
antitrust infractions in the context of an increasingly global
economy. The standard should “mitigate friction between
different nations’ antitrust regimes and provide more clarity to
foreign actors.” 263
Due to the FTAIA’s ambiguity and the “myriad of fact
patterns that can arise,” policy considerations will likely “play a
large role in ultimately deciding the scope of the FTAIA.” 264
Comity concerns are even more important today because many
countries now have their own antitrust enforcement regimes—the
United States is not the only competition watchdog anymore. 265
262. See Recent Case, supra note 258, at 764 (“[A] proximate cause standard
does not provide useful guidance to individual and corporate actors in foreign
markets. . . . [T]hey must constantly evaluate whether their actions have
‘proximate effects’ on U.S. markets—if this impact can be determined ex ante at
all.”).
263. Id. at 759.
264. Robert Connolly, Why Motorola Mobility Was a Good Decision for
CAPERS
(Feb.
6,
2015),
Global
Cartel
Enforcement,
CARTEL
http://cartelcapers.com/blog/motorola-mobility-good-decision-global-cartel-enforce
ment/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
265. See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 826
(7th Cir. 2015) (“No longer is the United States ‘the world’s competition
policeman,’ as it used to be called, because other nations have stricter antitrust
laws, in some respects, than ours.”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2015); see also
Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Address at the 56th Annual Spring Meeting of the ABA Section of
Antitrust Law: Recent Developments, Trends, and Milestones in the Antitrust
Division’s
Criminal
Enforcement
Program
18
(Mar.
26,
2008),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/232716.pdf (“Seemingly with each
passing day, the antitrust community learns of a foreign government that has
enacted a new antitrust law, created a new cartel investigative unit, obtained a
record antitrust fine, or adopted a new corporate leniency program.”); Andreas
Mundt, Chair, Int’l Competition Network, Focus, Inclusiveness and
Implementation—The ICN as a Key Factor for Global Convergence in
Competition Law 2 (Sept. 5, 2013), http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/
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Governmental antitrust enforcement has proliferated around the
world. 266 In 2014, global penalties for price-fixing reached a
record-breaking total of $5.3 billion—thirty-one percent more
than the 2013 total. 267 For comparison, the DOJ Antitrust
Division issued penalties totaling $861.4 million in the 2014 fiscal
year 268 and $1.02 billion in the 2013 fiscal year. 269
Competition authorities in Asia issued record-level antitrust
fines of over $1.7 billion in 2014. 270 This represents a significant
increase when compared to Asian fines in prior years—the 2013
penalties totaled $1.2 billion, and the average of the previous five
years (2008–2012) also equaled $1.2 billion. 271 This dramatic rise
in enforcement in Asia comes as authorities “have become
increasingly emboldened by maturing competition laws—many of
which are only a few years old.” 272

uploads/library/doc924.pdf (noting that the International Competition Network
now has 126 agency members from 111 jurisdictions).
266. See Robert E. Connolly, Why the Motorola Mobility Decision was Good
for Cartel Enforcement and Deterrence, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Jan. 2015, at 3–
4 (describing the “dramatic” increase in antitrust prosecutions and fines); see
also supra note 265 and accompanying text (noting expansion in number of
governmental enforcement regimes); infra notes 267–272 and accompanying
text (discussing increased enforcement).
267. Caroline Binham, Global Fines for Price-Fixing Hit $5.3bn Record
High, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2015, 4:44 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/
cms/s/0/83c27142-95a8-11e4-b3a6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3RT9wzz1A (last
visited Nov. 16, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
268. ALLEN & OVERY, GLOBAL CARTEL ENFORCEMENT: 2014 YEAR IN REVIEW 4
(2015), http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Documents/Cartel%20re
port.pdf. The DOJ’s fiscal year runs from October to September. Id.
269. Division Update Spring 2014, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.
justice.gov/atr/division-update/2014/division-update-spring-2014 (last visited
Nov. 16, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
270. See Peter Dahl, Asia Antitrust Watchdogs Issue Record Fines, DW (Jan.
8, 2015), http://www.dw.de/asia-antitrust-watchdogs-issue-record-fines/a-18
176691 (last visited Nov. 16, 2015) (reporting Asian antitrust penalties in 2014)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Competition Law
Developments in East Asia—December 2014, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Dec.
2014),
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/cn/knowledge/publications/124572/
competition-law-developments-in-east-asia-december-2014 (last visited Nov. 16,
2015) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
271. See Competition Law Developments in East Asia—December 2014,
supra note 270 (summarizing antitrust fines in East Asia).
272. Dahl, supra note 270.
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International enforcement cooperation “has dramatically
changed the landscape from the days when a company could fix
prices worldwide and face significant sanctions in very few
jurisdictions.” 273 Cooperation among competition agencies is vital
to effective detection and prosecution of anticompetitive
behavior. 274 Best efforts and “cooperation from foreign
governments in global investigations” have greatly aided the
DOJ’s ability to punish anticompetitive activity. 275 Because
governmental prosecutions serve as a primary deterrent to
anticompetitive conduct, they are an essential component of
global cartel enforcement. 276 Thus, maintaining cooperative
relationships with foreign agencies is necessary to deter illegal
behavior. 277 Mutual trust and respect among competition
agencies are crucial to preserving this close cooperation. 278
The reasonably proximate causal nexus standard has the
flexibility and breadth to encompass the policy concern of
maintaining international enforcement cooperation. In applying
the reasonably proximate causal nexus test, courts should
interpret the word direct narrowly in light of the important
comity considerations. 279 Treble damages often entice private
273. Connolly, supra note 264. For example, numerous jurisdictions
initiated enforcement actions in the LCD cartel investigation, including the
United States, European Union, Korea, Canada, Brazil, China, and Japan. Id.
274. See id. (“This cooperation takes many forms, both seen (coordinated
dawn raids, MLAT treaties, extradition) and unseen (sharing of information).”);
see also Hammond, supra note 265, at 18 (stating that the “shared commitment”
among competition enforcement authorities “to fighting international cartels
has led to the establishment of cooperative relationships . . . in order to more
effectively investigate and prosecute international cartels”).
275. Connolly, supra note 266, at 2; see also Hammond, supra note 265, at
18 (noting that “cooperation and assistance . . . from foreign governments, and
from their own enforcement efforts,” have enhanced the DOJ’s enforcement
capabilities).
276. See Hammond, supra note 265, at 2 (“The Division has long emphasized
that the most effective way to deter and punish cartel activity is to hold culpable
individuals accountable by seeking jail sentences.”).
277. See Connolly, supra note 264 (emphasizing the importance of
international enforcement cooperation).
278. Id. (discussing how to maintain enforcement cooperation).
279. This comports with the Supreme Court’s prior warning that “rampant
extraterritorial application of U.S. law ‘creates a serious risk of interference
with a foreign nation’s ability to independently regulate its own commercial
affairs.’” Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 824 (7th
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plaintiffs, but courts must not allow this temptation to infringe
on foreign sovereigns’ interests in punishing antitrust violations
that occur within their own borders. 280 Courts must also be
conscious of the significant differences between actions initiated
by the DOJ and damages actions brought by private plaintiffs. 281
The DOJ, acting on behalf of the U.S. government, clearly “has
reason to weigh comity and sovereignty concerns when bringing
international . . . cartel case[s].” 282 Private plaintiffs, on the other
hand, do not. 283
Courts should construe the antitrust laws, including the
FTAIA, so as to avoid undue encroachment into other nations’
sovereign authority and legitimate interests. 284 The Supreme
Court has cautioned against overreaching, which poses a “serious
risk of interference with a foreign nation’s ability to
independently regulate its own commercial affairs.” 285 The
proximate causation doctrine, while admittedly amorphous,
allows for accommodation of comity concerns because it is not a
rigid and fixed standard. 286 The reasonably proximate causal
Cir. 2015) (quoting F. Hoffman–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155,
165 (2004)).
280. See F. Hoffman–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164
(2004) (citations omitted) (directing statutory construction that “avoid[s]
unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations”).
281. See Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 826–27 (citing Robert E. Connolly,
Repeal the FTAIA! (Or at Least Consider it as Coextensive with Harford Fire),
CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Sept. 2014, at 3 (discussing problems with private
antitrust suits).
282. Id. at 826 (citing Robert Connolly, Motorola Mobility and the FTAIA,
CARTEL CAPERS (Sept. 30, 2014), http://cartelcapers.com/blog/motorola-mobilityftaia/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review)).
283. Id. (citing Robert Connolly, Motorola Mobility and the FTAIA, CARTEL
CAPERS (Sept. 30, 2014), http://cartelcapers.com/blog/motorola-mobility-ftaia/
(last visited Nov. 16, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)).
284. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
582 (1986) (emphasizing that “American antitrust laws do not regulate the
competitive conditions of other nations’ economies”); see also Empagran, 542
U.S. at 165 (“Why should American law supplant, for example, Canada’s or
Great Britain’s or Japan’s own determination about how to best protect
Canadian or British or Japanese customers from anticompetitive conduct
engaged in significant part by Canadian or British or Japanese or other foreign
companies?”).
285. Id. at 165.
286. Supra Part IV.B.
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nexus test permits comprehensive evaluations and affords courts
the ability to properly consider a foreign sovereign’s authority
when analyzing whether foreign conduct may be redressed in the
United States.
VI. Conclusion
Courts should adopt the Second and Seventh Circuit’s
reasonably proximate causal nexus test because it is superior
standard to the immediate consequence test. 287 It has the
flexibility to address the increasingly complex nature of global
commerce and the rapidly evaporating international trade
barriers. 288 The reasonably proximate causal nexus test is a loyal
construction of the statute’s plain language because it does not
render any word meaningless. It also serves the FTAIA’s
fundamental goal of protecting domestic commerce. 289
Furthermore, the test affords courts the opportunity to
incorporate comity concerns into their analyses. 290 While not a
perfect standard, the reasonably proximate causal nexus test is
currently the best option because it allows for zealous
enforcement of the antitrust laws, as well as respectful
consideration of the legitimate interests of foreign nations.

287. Supra Parts IV.B.1–3.
288. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 412–13 (2d
Cir. 2014) (asserting that proximate causation can address the “kind of complex
manufacturing process [that] is increasingly common in our modern global
economy”).
289. Supra Part IV.B.2.
290. Supra Part V.

